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CARE NEEDED IN DRAFTING QTIP
PROVISIONS AND IN POST-DEATH
PLANNING TO REPAIR DEFICIENCIES
— by Neil E. Harl*
Action by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in late 1998 in Rinaldi v.
United States,1 affirming a 1997 U.S. Court of Federal Claims case2 has focused
attention on an approach to disposing of an interest in a closely-held business that can
render the property ineligible for qualified terminable interest property (QTIP)
treatment.3  The problem related to a will provision giving a son the right to purchase
stock in a closely-held corporation at less than fair market value.4  The res lt was
ineligibility for the QTIP election.5
The QTIP concept
The QTIP election, enacted in 1981,6 permits a decedent to leave a life estate to a
surviving spouse and to designate the recipients of the remainder interest, thus
controlling who ultimately receives the property.7  Before enactment of the QTIP
concept, for a marital deduction it was necessary to leave property to the surviving
spouse outright or to leave the surviving spouse a life estate but the life estate had to be
coupled with a general power of appointment.8  In either event, the decedent lost control
over who ultimately received the property.
With a QTIP election, it is necessary for two conditions to be met:  (1) The surviving
spouse must be entitled to all of the income from the entire interest or all of the income
from a specific part of the interest payable annually or more frequently, for a period
measured solely by the surviving spouse’s life9 and (2) there must not be a power in any
person to appoint any part of the property subject to the qualifying income interest to
any person other than the spouse during the spouse’s life.10  It was the second of those
conditions that was the focus of the Rinaldi case.11
Rinaldi v. United States
In Rinaldi v. United States,12  The decedent left stock in a closely-held printing
company by will under a QTIP arrangement to his wife for life with the stock
distributed at her death to his son.  If the son were to give up day-to-day management of
the company, the trustee was to offer to sell the printing company stock to the son at
book value.13  The book value was $1,390,178 with a fair market value of $1,520,067.14
After the decedent’s will was executed, the printing company elected to be taxed
under Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code.15  At that time, trusts could own
stock in an S corporation but only for a limited time after death.16  Eleven months after
the decedent’s death, the stock in the printing company was redeemed at fair market
______________________________________________________________________________
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value from the trust to avoid loss of the Subchapter S election.17
Seven days later the federal estate tax return was filed.
The court agreed that the will provision giving the son the
right to purchase the stock at book value (if the son ceased day-
to-day management of the company) was at a price
substantially below fair market value.  That, the court agreed,
would run counter to the QTIP requirement that “no person has
a power to appoint any part of the property to any person other
than the surviving spouse.”18  This, the court reasoned, would
permit property which had avoided taxation in the decedent’s
estate through the QTIP election to escape taxation in the
surviving spouse’s estate, also.
The estate argued that the redemption of the stock—seven
days before the QTIP election was made—removed the
obstacle inasmuch as of the date of the election, the trust owned
none of the shares and the son had no right to purchase the
shares at a bargain price--book value.19  The court rejected the
IRS argument that the eligibility requirements for QTIP must be
met at the date of death.20  But the court agreed that the post-
death redemption of the shares did not bring the will into
compliance with the statutory requirements for QTIP
eligibility.21  Thus, the trust property did not qualify for a
marital deduction under the QTIP provision.
Lessons from Rinaldi
The opinion in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims22 was
affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.23
The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari on March 9, 1999.
The case contains two clear lessons:  (1) If a QTIP election is
contemplated, be wary of any bargain purchase arrangements
(which are not uncommon in farm and ranch estate planning as
testators often struggle with how to pass ownership interests in
the family business to the on-farm heir or heirs); and (2)
circumstances which are fatal to the QTIP election may not be
correctible by post-death but pre-election planning maneuvers.
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EXEMPTIONS
HOMESTEAD. The debtors owned a residence which
included 80 acres which they claimed as a rural homestead
exempt under Tex. Prop. Code § 41.002(b). The residence area
was situated within the municipal boundaries of a city and had a
city street running in front of the house. The street had other
residences on the other side and some small businesses. The
residence had access to and used city water and sewage and was
serviced by the city police and fire departments. The rest of the
property was outside of the city limits and was used to graze
cattle and grow wheat and hay but the debtor’s income came
primarily from a separate business. The court held that the
property was not a rural homestead and that the debtors were
entitled to exempt only the residence and the surrounding one
acre of land. In re Grisham, 230 B.R. 529 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
1998).
TOOLS OF THE TRADE. The debtor was 38 years old and
owned a 73 acre rural residence. The debtor had not farmed the
land for the past two years and was employed full time off the
farm. The debtor owned 35 beef cows and 35 calves which
were kept on the debtor’s father’s farm and tended to by the
father. The debtor did not give any estimate of when the debtor
would return to active farming. The debtor sought to exempt
several pieces of farm machinery as tools of the trade of
farming. The court acknowledged that a debtor could qualify as
a farmer while having full time employment off-farm but held
that the debtor did not qualify as a farmer because the debtor
was not actively engaged in a farming business and had no
